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ABSTRACT
This paperfocusesonhowEuropeanpublicpolicies---individuallyand collectively
--influence thediffusionof knowledgeand technology. It beginswithan overview
of the roles played historicallyand currentlyby Europeangovernmentsin the
research,development,andproduction(RD&P)of large commercialaircraft(LCA).
The analyticalframeworkbringstogetherliteraturefrom globalpoliticaleconomy,
comparativepolitics,businessmanagement,and scienceandtechnologypolicy
studies. It distinguishesbetweenthe productionof knowledge,onthe one hand,
and the disseminationof knowledge,on the other. France,Germany, and the
UnitedKingdomserveas the analyticalcases. The paper concludeswitha call for
additionalresearchinthisarea, sometentativelessonslearned,and a discussion
of the consequencesof national strategies and policies for the diffusion of
knowledgeandtechnologyinan era of globalization.
INTRODUCTION
Aviation has long had a dose, often symbiotic relationship with the state. Decades of direct and indirect
govemment supportfor the industryhave producedan unprecedented level of sophistication in both military
and commercial aviation. Govemments have utilized a variety of market intervention instruments to
promote the diffusion--production, transfer, and use-of aeronautical knowledge and technology. Individual
European states--namely France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (U.K.)---have impressive histories of
aeronautical innovation; collectively they--namely France, Germany, and the U.K., together with the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain--have collaborated successfully since World War II to rebuild their
indigenous aeronautical capacities under the Airbus Industrie (AI) umbrella. European collaboration to
research,develop, and produce (RD&P) large commercial aircraft (LCA) is all the more remarkable because
they do not share a common language or culture, but do share an extended history of mistrust and conflict.
Add these obstacles to the incredibly complex task of LCA RD&P, and the enormity of their success
becomes all the more impressive. This paper focuses on the innovation strategies and policies of France,
Germany, and the U.K.; eventually, the analysis will be expanded to include knowledge diffusion strategies
and policiesadopted by the European Union (EU) as well. The intent is to leam which knowledge diffusion
strategies and policiesare efficient, effective, and successful in generating advances in goods and services
nationally in a global economy characterized by mutual dependencies across a myriad of issue areas.
The diffusion of aeronautical knowledge and technology is particularly relevant to this task. F/rst,
both knowledge and technologyare essential ingredientsof the innovation required to create new or improve
extant processes, products, systems, or services which are qualitatively superior or significantly less
expensive than those already in the market. Innovation, in turn, is deemed critical both to national defense
and to maintaining economic competitiveness in the global economy. In the realm of national defense,
aviation is a keystone of the industrial base which produces the multitude of systems--weapons,
transportation, communications, and infrastructure---as well as the personnel and training necessary to
provide security. Aviation also serves as an economic linchpin, highly valued for its =spill-over" effects,
either as a powerful force pushing innovation through a cascade of "down-stream" activities, or as a =first
user" of novel technologies. The drive to attain and sustain military superiority and economic
competitiveness has consistently compelled national governments to support science and technology pre-
commercial research and development (R&D) (Cohen, 1994; Council on Competitiveness, 1994; Dertouzos,
Lester, and Solow, 1989; Julius, 1990; Lopez and Yager, 1987; National Academy of Engineering, 1988;
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Nau, 1974; Rapldn and Strand, 1995; Ruggie, 1975; Servan-Schreiber, 1968; Strange, 1988; Tyson, 1988;
1992; VanTulder and Junne, 1988; Williams, 1984; Yoffie, 1993).
Thus, aviation plays a special role in the national innovation systems of several of the most
important countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In addition,
for the United States (U.S.), the U.K., and France, aerospace products constitute a major source of
manufacturing exports, adding a trade dimension to the strategic importance of that sector (Council on
Competitiveness, 1996; Gellman Research Associates, 1992; 1990; Hayward, 1994; Nelson, 1993; Tyson,
1988; 1992; U.S. International Trade Commission, 1993; 1984; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment, 1991). Govemments can use a number of strategies and policies to promote an industry sector,
a particular project, or even a specific technology, including financial subsidies, information dissemination,
government mandated technology transfer from foreign sources, technical standards, and govemment
procurement (Pinelli, Kennedy, Barclay and Bishop, 1997, p. 135; Mowery, 1994). More broadly, public
policy establishes the market parameters (e.g., trade and investment rules) as well as the education and
legal (e.g., intellectual property rights) infrastructures within which innovation occurs.
Second, governments and corporations confront an intriguing problem with respect to the diffusion
of knowledge and technology:neither has intrinsicvalue. Their value lies in their usability; that is, knowledge
and technologymust be accessible by the institutions, firms, or individuals which create or improve military
or commercial processes, products, systems, or services. In addition, knowledge and technology must be
"practicar'---relevant and applicable to the goals of produdng new or improved processes, products, systems,
or services. Useable knowledge and technologyare embedded with explicit (science) and tacit (engineering)
components; they provide workable and effective solutions to problems. Generally, technological knowledge
is best utilized by engineers because they have gained the tac/t knowiedgs_--personal, context-specific,
experiential (see Pinelli, Kennedy, Barclay and Bishop, 1997, p. 90; Polanyi, 1966; Bateson, 1973; and
Teece, 1981)--which enables them to deploy knowledge and technology most effectively. At a minimum,
experienced employees who have worked with related materials, processes, and products will benefit the
most from emerging technologicalknowledge;the tacit knowledge they have gained as a result of 9earning-
by-doing" and "learning-by-usingn is invaluable as they attempt to innovate using new technologies.
T/drd, LCA RD&P and technological innovation share key charactedstics: Each is inherently dsky
and requires grappling with unknowns that may be technical, economic, or merely the manifestation of
pemonal and social variables (Rogers, 1982). LCA producers and technological innovators seldom work in
a predictable environment; usually the payoffs are uncertain and distant. In the LCA sector, these
imponderables comprise both "known unknowns"and "unknown unknowns'---referred to as "unk-unks."
Knownunknownsarethe normal,unremarkableimprovementsthat, it is assumed,
will be called for sooner or later.... Unk-unks are the less predictable
contingencies;the assumptionis that any new airplane or engine intendedto
advancethe state of the artwill harboritsown surprisesinthe formof problems
that are whollyunforeseen(Newhouse,1982, p. 19).
Despite this remarkable level of uncertainty, LCA producers and technological innovators must make
decisions and complete extraordinarily complex tasks. To do so they seek data, information, or knowledge
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which will help moderate uncertainty. Hence, examples of successful (or even failed) knowledge manage-
ment--such as we find in the European aeronautics expedence---can provide important lessons for
policymakers around the world.
Fourth, LCA RD&P is a knowledge-dependent industry sector the benefits of which---both tangible
and intangible--am so deady perceived by government policymakers around the wodd that virtually every
nation will do what it can to participate in the sector. The question is what kind of intervention is efficient,
effective, and successful.
BACKGROUND
Governmental officials are expected to adopt strategies and policies which they determine will
enable their individual countries to be safe from external attack and to be economically viable. In a world
where knowledgeand technologyare increasingly recognized as critical to the achievement of beth military
securityand economiccompetitiveness, policymakers should explore how best to foster the most effective
creation and dissemination of knowledge and technology for and to domestic users. If we define effective
creation and dissemination of knowledge and technology as including the production of an economically
competitive product,then, as we enter the twenty-fi_t century, this task is complicated by the skyrocketing
cost and collateral risk of this laudable goal. In an industry sector such as commercial aviation, the task is
further complicated by the simultaneous expansion of the market to global proportions and the shrinking
number of consumers° Add to this the problem created by the extraordinary cost of LCA to consumers, and
pclicymakersare confronted withan almost paralyzing dilemma. Can they really expect to support and foster
independent indigenous economic competitors without alienating foreign consumers upon whom they are
dependent and with whom they are competing for sales? If not, how do they join forces with their
competitorsso asto enjoy the benefits of profitableproductionwithout undermining the success and survival
of their indigenous capabilities?
European policymakersgrapple withjust this dilemma today. On the one hand, market forces seem
to be compelling them toward greater unity and merging of capabilities; on the other hand, historical and
political forces encourage protection from the vulnerability which inevitably accompanies the mutual
dependencies of integration. The seedlings of this dilemma were first evident immediately following World
War II as government officials and corporate decision-makers recognized the potential negative
consequences of parochial state involvement for their own domestic economies in a world shrunk by
increasinglysophisticated communications and transportation systems. The original intervention dilemma
confrontingstate policymakers--finding the balance between excessive and insufficient government support
of domestic economies-became one of how "toengineer a competitive presence in a full range of industrial
activitieswith instrumentsof publicintervention that are not necessarily very effective and that threaten the
well-being of the international economic system" (Shepherd, Duchene, and Saunders, 1983, p. 21). The
need to resolvethis dilemma is exacerbated in industry sectors such as transportation and communication
which are naturalmonopolies if private actorsare allowed to act "freely" in the market (Chandler and Daems,
1980). As the market transitions from domestic to global proportions government and corporate officials
must negotiate a compromise between unilateral and multilateral costs and benefits (Golich, 1992; 1991;
Hayward 1994; 1986; Stirk and Willis, 1991).
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AnalyticalConsiderations
FourfactorshelpusunderstandEuropeanapproachestoknowledgeandtechnologydiffusion:F/rst,
nations can employ a "mission-oriented" strategy, a "diffusion-oriented= strategy, or some combination
thereof (Ergas, 1987). The former is characterized by large scale project work, centering on large firms with
a heavy emphasis on defense, nuclear power, and aerospace. The latter emphasizes broader, more gen-
eralized forms of investment, notably in pre-competitive, collaborative research, standards development,
and training. "Mission-oriented=strategies are characteristic of the U.S., the U.K. and France where, since
1945, national defense and prestige have been key national goals. In contrast, Germany adopted a "diffu-
sion-oriented"slrategy;Japan adopted a unique hybridapproach (see Pinelli, Kennedy, Barclay, and Bishop,
1997). The general trend in innovation policysince the mid-1980s, when Ergas introduced the "mission= and
"diffusion"distinction,has been to emphasize diffusionist strategies. To some extent, this trend follows the
end of the Cold War which triggered a shift of resources away from defense programs to a growing
preoccupation with economic competitiveness in a global market (Sandholz, 1992; Peterson, 1993).
Because aviation frequently involves or requires the building of prototypes, the development of
proof-of-concepts, and flight tests (whether civil or military), it stands to benefit from mission-oriented
governmental support perhaps more than other knowledge intensive, high technology industry sectors. The
la@_st slice of aeronautical R&D is the "D"phase of getting something to work to specification. However,
since the 1930s, development has been predicated on increased understanding of fundamental
aerodynamics (i.e., theoretical and experimental) and the technologies associated with the RD&P of LCA.
Such understanding requires, at a minimum, significant investment in an education system capable of
graduating an appropriately trained workforce, including scientists, engineers, and highly skilled production
workers; research,testing, and productionfadlitles; and both fundamental and applied research, which itself
may be best facilitated by the pmduclk)n of'technology demonstrators" to validate basic concepts and better
aid the transition from design to production (European Union, 1992; Rosenberg, 1982).
Second, government intervention in the market varies across at least two dimensions: the level of
intensity--or degree of involvement and direction proffered by the government--and preferred style--or
degree of interventiontransparency. Policymakers may actively guide and shape their national markets by
creatingconsumer demand and by encouragingcommodity supply. Alternatively, policymakers may prefer,
rhetoricallyat least, to remain at arms lengthand intervene only when it is perceived to be absolutely critical.
In addition, govemments can employ a wide range of direct and indirect mechanisms as they seek to
influence both supplyand demand, includingovert fundingof R&D, production and sale subsidies, regulatory
relief, tax incentives, enhanced intellectualproperty fights, technical assistance, expedited approvals for new
products,antitrustroles,and so forth. The consequences of each of these policies, as well as many others,
have been studied extensively by others. (For more on science and technology policy choices and
consequences, see Alic, 1986; Chiang, 1993; Cordes, 1988; Ergas, 1987; Golich, 1992; Heaton, 1989;
Logsdon, 1986; Mansfield, 1986; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989a; 1989b; Nelson, 1984; Pavitt and Walker,
1976; Rothwell, 1982; Schacht, 1998). Most European states intervene more aggressively, more frequently,
and with a set of policies that are more transparent than those used by the U.S. (For more on intervention
instruments generally employed by European countries to influence market dynamics, see Gayle and
Goodrich, 1990; Nelson, 1984; Shepherd, Duchene, and Saunders, 1983; Vernon, 1976).
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Th/n/, national and regional histoneshelp explain why governments adopt distinct approaches to the
production,transfer, and use of knowledge. The United States evolved into a =regulatory state" (Johnson,
1982), which, for the most part, focuses on implementing rules to guide market activity and eschews the
establishment of economic targets as a government responsibility. Most modem European states emerged
as political units during the era of economic mercantilism, when wealth and power were each considered
proper ultimate ends of national policy (Golich, 1992; Viner, 1958). The early feudal political structures
common to almost all antecedents of today's European nations obligated the governing elites to intervene
in local economies. The classical liberal economics which replaced mercantilism in the late eighteenth and
eady nineteenth centuriesstill articulateda dear govemmental responsibilityfor providing key infrastructures
to fadlitate trade (Kindlebe_ger,1978; Smith, 1958). As a result, firms in strategic industries---typically those
related to transportation and communication--were frequently state-owned or were allowed to monopolize
productionand sales; despite the recent trend toward privatizing these firms and exposing them to greater
competition globally,European governments--individually and collectively--remain quite willing to intervene
openly and assertivelyto achieve economic or social goals. Insofar as the overall goal of European states
is economic growth or social welfare, they can be considered =developmental" (Johnson, 1982).
European governments have adopted two broad categories of technology strategies and policies:
general and selective subsidies (F/_lster, 1991; Rothwell and Zegveld, 1981). General subsidies are used
to promote the R&D activities of any firm, whereas selective subsidies target specific projects (e.g., the
creation and maintenance of Airbus Industrie). European governments have chosen to employ an array of
technologystrategies and policiesto encourage innovationfor five reasons: (a) to overcome the disincentive
to invest in R&D which dedves from the fact that firms are seldom able to appropriate the benef'Cs associated
with the knowledge and technology they produce; almost by definition, knowledge and technological
innovation is difficultto contain; (b) to spread risk more widely---across society as a whole---since firms may
be too riskaveme to engage in projects that are costly and have uncertain payoffs, hence government has
an ob#gat/onto assume some or all of the risk; (c) to accelerate the diffusion of knowledge and technology
among firms because to do so will encourage the adoption of profdable new product and process tech-
nologies deemed vital to firm-, industry-, and, ultimately, national-level competitiveness; (d) to increase
returns to scale in R&D by increasing firm size; and (e) to discourage competitive and duplicative R&D at
the firm level. (For a more detailed discussion of these points see FOlster, 1992, pp. 26-30. For more on
levels of competitiveness, see Eden and Molot, 1996; Golich, 1996; Kudde, 1996; Moore, 1996; Rapkin and
Strand, 1996. For more on the effect of history, ideology, and culture on national approaches to innovation
policy see Brander, 1987; Cemy, 1980; Chandler, 1977; Chandler and Daems, 1980; Chapman, 1991;
Chesnais, 1993; GiUispie, 1980; Gilpin 1968; Golich, 1992; Hoffman, et al., 1963; Keck, 1993; Markovits,
1986; Porter, 1990; Sorge, 1991; Talalay, Farrands, and Tooze, 1997; Underhill, 1997).
Fourth, policy choices are influenced by the perceptions decision makers hold with respect to their
state's position in the international system (Golich, 1992; Haggard and Simmons, 1987; Ikenberry, 1986;
Katzenstein, 1985; Servan-Schreiber, 1968). Whereas the United States was motivated in the 1980s to
explore the use of policies to promotetechnological innovation due to a perceived crisis of competitiveness
(Golich, 1996; Kudrle, 1996; Heaton, 1989; Porter, 1990), Europeans grew concerned with their economic
competitivenessstatus as early as the 1980s (see, e.g., Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, 1968; Scherer, 1992; Servan-Schreiber, 1988). Nevertheless, the publication of the =technology
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gap" series of studies commissionedby the OECD (1968) and Servan-Schreiber's The American Challenge
(1968) triggered an even more aggressive use of industrial and technology policies designed to sustain or
reinvigoratetheir competitiveness vis-_vis the U.S. (Scherer, 1992). Since 1945, the U.S. has been a world
leader in aeronautics and, as such, has provided the competitive focus for European nations. Moreover, the
U.S. remains the single most important market for many European and Asian companies---a fact that condi-
tions many coq0orateand national technology strategies. Europeans, concerned that they were "becoming
an economic colony of the United States" (Thornton,1995, p. 19), recognized =that a broad capability in high-
technology was more than a necessary requisite to military power;, it had become essential to status as a
first-rate economic power" (Hochmuth, 1974, p. 145). Aerospace was a logical focus for technolegy policy
because its "strategicpositionextends beyond the obvious military significance of such industries to overall
considerations of international status and predominance in the future development of science and tech-
nology" (Todd and Simpson, 1985, p. 33; emphasis added).
U.S. aeronautical leadership was obtained by close cooperation between state and industry.
Extensive federal support for production,transfer, and use of aeronautical knowledge and technology began
in 1917 underthe auspices of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). It was later strongly
influenced by extensive Cold War military procurement and defense-related R&D, and managed by the
NACA's 1958 replacement, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). in short, this was
a "mission-oriented" technology strategy par excellence; it worked largely due to the range, scale, and
overlap of early U.S. civil and military "missions,= and to the flexibility of U.S. organizational structures
(Ergas, 1987). Europeans have consistently sought to remain competitive with the U.S. in key industrial
sectors. In the case of aviation, three factors motivated their involvement: First, as in the U.S., it is strategic
to both the national defense and the economy; second, by the end of the 1930s, they had yielded their
position as a wodd leader in aeronautics to the U.S.; and th/rd, they consider the downstream and lateral
flows of technological discoveries into the broader economy as well as the upstream technological
developments critical to LCA RD&P, as important elements in maintaining healthy employment.
What follows is an overview of the rolesplayed by France, Germany, and the U.K. in promoting the
production,transfer, and use of aeronautical knowledgeand technology relevant to the RD&P of LCA. These
three countries have been selected because of their critical position in the RD&P LCA historically and of
Airbus Industrie aircraft currently. (It is important to note that the many countries which comprise the
European continent differ significantlyin histories,ideologies,cultures, traditions, governance structures, and
policyselectionand implementation pattems. For discussions of other European national approaches see,
for example, Chiang, 1993; Guile and Brooks, 1987; Hart, 1992; Hayward, 1986; Hochmuth, 1974; Nelson,
1993; 1984; Vernon, 1970).
European Approaches to Knowledge and Technology Diffusion
Like many high-cost,knowledge-intensiveindustries,aeronautics--and especially LCA production---
have lookedoutside of a purelynational base for capital and technology. With aeronautics heavily depend-
ent on the flow of "upstream" technological innovation--especially in materials, electronics, and process
technologies_the industry adopted a transnational approach to technology scanning and acquisition
(Rosenbe_, 1982). Unable to match the U.So in market size and R&D base, individual European firms and
Golich&Pinelli---KnowledgeDiffusion'sInfluenceonAeronauticalInnovation 7
theirgovernmentsponsorswereforced by budgetary pressure to cooperate in LCA RD&P since the mid-
1960s. As a result,European product development in several areas--LCA, advanced combat aircraft, and
satellite launchers--is now based on long-lived transnationalconsortia. W'dh the exception of strategic mis-
sile systems, European collaboration has embraced every civil and military industry sector. Formal cross-
border collaborationis undeq_innedby a global network of suppliersand subcontractors feeding components,
equipment, and substructures into the prime contractors in the U.S. and Europe. The recent collapse in de-
mand for military products, triggered by the fall of the Soviet Union, has combined with other commercial
pressures to encourage the development of genuine transnational firms (Hayward, 1994).
The intemationalization of aeronautics has created a set of intriguing problems for national
innovation and trade policies due to the complex interpenetration of national aeronautical industry and
technology systems. On the one hand, economic pressures and the globalization of knowledge and
technology combined with the demands of foreign governments demanding partnership agreements as a
price for market access to generate centripetal forces in the industry (Golich, 1992). On the other,
governments and firms continue to prize technological leadership and the strategic importance of
commanding "firstplace=inaeronautical innovaUon. This is not always a crudely nationalistic phenomenon:
the position of European states is especially complicated, where corporate managers have acquiesced to
the reality that European industrycompetes against the U.S. in core areas, but where a national edge is still
valued as a means to influence the structure of joint ventures and to maximize individual retums from a
collective effort. As a result, Europe's march toward collaborative RD&P has not been easy (Lorell, 1980;
Stirk and Willis, 1991). As Nelson (1993) observes generally about global trends in technology policy, "there
is a tension caused by the attempts of national governments to form and implement national technology
policies in a world where business and technology are increasingly transnationar (p.18). Arguably, these
tensions are especially evident in aeronautics where national strategies have to co-exist with, if not
globalization, certainly with the regionalization of industrial and technological capabilities.
France, Germany and the U.K. together account for over 85% of Europe's total aerospace output.
Of the three, France has the largest annual sales followed by Britain and Germany. The Spanish, Italian,
Dutch---now almost entirely absorbed by Daimler-Benz Aerospace (formerly Deutsche Aerospace
A.G.)--and the Swedish industriesmake up the remainder. Only the British and the French can claim a full
scope of aerospace capability, withworld class airframe, engine, and equipment companies in both the civil
and militarysectors.The Britishboastsuperior capability in civil engines, whereas the French and Germans
have better space competence. Throughout Europe, states and firms share a long tradition of partnership
in aeronautical civil and military development (Hayward, 1994). Governments have involved themselves
directlyin restructuringquestions and, occasionally,in management through public ownership of major firms.
What follows is an examination of this relationship: the role government has played in the aeronautical
research and technology (R&'I') in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
FRANCE
France has one of the most explicit and aggressive sets of national strategies and policies for
aeronauticsand space development in Europe. These strategies and policies have been in place since the
late 1940s, but were given emphasis and direction by President Chades de Gaulle and have since been
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reinforcedbygovemmentsof boththeLeftandRight.Theapproachreflectsa clearlyarticulatedpolicyof
nationalindependenceinarmsproductionandofamodernizedFrencheconomy based on developing high-
technology industries(Gilpin, 1968; Kolodziej, 1987); it is grounded on the principle of dir/g/sme--a concept
of guided industrial and technological development implemented through a mix of instruments including
central planning (much less important new than in the 1950s and 1960s), state-funded research centers,
public procurement, projectsubsidization,and enteq_dse capitalization. These technologies z)po/nt and their
associated industrial structures comprise several
stronglycomparlmentanzedsectoralsubsystemsoftenworkingfor publicmarkets
and invariablyinvolvingan _//ance betweenthe State and public and/or private
business enterprises belongingto the o#9opo#st/ccore of French industry.
(Chesnais, 1993, p.192)
Evolution of French Technology Strategies and Policies
The development of science and technology--not to mention a manufacturing base--in France has
long been associatedwith public policy. Colbert founded the Acao_m/e Roya/e des Sc/ences in 1676 to fos-
ter scientificcapabilities; members of the Acad6m/e explicitly linked science and technology to manufactur-
ing. Public policy---inthe name of LouisX]V---created the manufactures (Chesnais, 1993; Crossland, 1975;
Gillipsie, 1980). This connection was reinforced years later dudng the Napoleonic Wars when the British
naval blockade compelled the French to place science-based innovation in the industrial core. The perva-
sive role of the government in promoting targeted innovations has resulted in a corporatist arrangement---a
triumvirate of govemment, business,and labor. As a result, French private capital only reluctantly supports
entrepreneurship or innovation; such assistance is perceived as the responsibility of govemment.
Napol6on shaped French innovation policy by restructuring the system of higher education which
trained scientists and engineers. After abolishing the university system of the Anc/en Rd_#ne, Napoi6on
reinvented higher education by separating universities from "professional" or technical schools, known as
Grand Ecoles. Univemity students studied the more traditional and esotedc liberal arts. The Grand Ecotes
focused on training experts, so students learned the results of science, but not the scientific method.
Graduates took jobs as "production engineers who applied existing knowledge, rather than research
engineers who could make substantial advances in the state of the art" (Chesnais, 1993, p. 197). Higher
education was mobilized to serve military and industrial purposes, and France, home to three of the world's
leading scientific institutions---Col/dge de France, the Eco/e Po/ytechn/que, and the Mus6um d'Histoire
Naturelle_became an international leader in science and technology. However, higher education did not
continue to receive the kind of support it needed to sustain this status during the Bourbon Restauration;
"reforms"during the Third Republicweakened the system further. By the beginning of the twentieth century,
the divorce of science from industryfor commercial purposes was well established. France had virtually no
industrial R&D laboratories similar in form and function to those proliferating in the United States and
Germany. As a result, few "science-push" industries developed in France. (For more on the evolution of
French science and technology, see Cemy, 1980; Chapman, 1987; Chesnais, 1993; Cohen, 1977; Giilipsie,
1980; Gilpin, 1968; Hoffman, et al., 1963; Kindleberger, 1978; Kolodziej, 1987; Kuisel, 1981; Papon, 1978;
Underhill, 1997; Zysman, 1978.)
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By the end of World War II, France's industrial foundation was in disarray. Technologically back-
ward, small in size, and decimated by the German occupation, the industrial base suffered also from its own
conservative tendencies. As Stanley Hoffman (1963) notes, France was a =stalemate society," where
stability and protection were preferred over growth and competition, a Malthusian fear for overproduction
of material goodsand of educated people reigned, and agrarian and religious interests dominated industrial
needs. It was nowonder that French industry was fragmented and restrained. Following Wodd War II, the
Fourth Republic took immediate steps to reinvigorate industry in general, and science and technology in
particular. In a consciouseffort to regain a foothold in the industry, France operated Europe's largest F-86
and B.29 maintenance facility in Chateurault (Samuels, 1994, p. 203). Several agencies were created for
the specific purpose of research and technology in a number of areas, including nuclear power, telecom-
munications, electronics, agriculture, and medicine. The most important of these was the Office National
d'Etudes et de RecherchesA_ospatiales (ONERA, the National Institute for Aerospace Research and Stu-
dies), created in 1946 with the mandate to undertake and sponsor both civil and military research.
Another key agency is the Cer_e/Va_ot_ de/a Recherche Sc/ent/fique (CNRS, National Center for
Scientific Research). Originally created in 1939, the CNRS was reinvented in 1945 to establish laboratories
and research facilities, to supportuniversity research (in part by seconding science faculty), and to subvene
scientific publications, purchase equipment, and support colloquia on scientific subjects. The CNRS is
expected to evaluate, conduct, or promote all research assisting the advancement of science; to assist in
the authentication and application of research findings; to disseminate scientific information; to coordinate
research development; and to promote national and international collaboration, writh the entry of the Fifth
Republic and Charles de Gaulle, greater emphasis was placed on the use of National Champions to regain
and maintain a competitive footholdin the global economy and to achieve independence in national defense.
In many ways, though some effort was made to move certain industrial sectors into the private sphere, the
govemment remained as involved, if not more, than before (Cemy, 1980; Gilpin, 1968).
French Public Policies Affecting the Diffusion of Knowledge and Technology
Today, French strategies and policies affecting the diffusion of knowledge and technology feature
four key characteristics. First, the extent of government involvement in R&D and technological innovation
is significant. More than 50% of the funds expended for R&D are provided by the government. The bulk
of these funds target the aeronautics, electronics,nuclear energy, space, and telecommunications industries.
However, many of the programs and projects undertaken in France are designed and dictated by
government officialsand bureaucrats. Govemment involvement in such undertakings tends to pull decision-
making away from program and project managers, create a rigid hierarchy, foster competition rather than
cooperat_, and lead to antagonisticrelationshipsbetween laborand management. As a result, government
involvement intechnological innovation has produced mixed results. Only two industri_armaceuticals
and aviation--can boast that they contnbute positively to the nation's overall balance of trade. (For more on
the structure of R&D, technological innovation, and the diffusion of knowledge and technology in France,
see Cemy, 1980; Chandler and Daems, 1980; Chesnais, 1993; Hoffman, et al., 1963; Underhill, 1997).
Second, since 1945, French technology strategies and policies have been heavily influenced by a
strong linkage to the military, with little concern for generating dual-use technologies. The Ministry of
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Defense,throughitsDe/egetk_ Genera/pour PAnnement (DGA, the Defense Procurement Office) oversees
35% of all French public R&D. It has responsibility (or tutelage) for the space industry's technical and
commercial development, whereas the Ministry of Transport oversees civil aviation programs and aidines
only. The Defense Ministry also has authority over ONERA, which is responsible for about 12% of French
aeronautical research with two-thirds of its funding derived from government contracts. ONERA is an
interdisciplinary research institute where scientists and engineers work with technicians and highly skilled
workers to advance theoretical, computational, and experimental knowledge. ONERA researchers have at
their disposalall the scientificinstruments, technical, and test facilities required both for long-term research
and for development projects conceming fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, missiles, launch vehicles, and
spacecraft. When French firms contract with ONERA, the fee is dependent on the degree to which results
are open to other companies; if they are generally available to industry, ONERA boars the bulk of the cost.
Unlike the U.S., where one agency_SA---conducts R&T related to both aeronautics and space,
the French have a separate agency--the CerCre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES)--which performs
space-related R&T (Hayward, 1994; Kolodziej, 1987; U.S. Congress, 1994a). Recently, French industrialists
have called for more money to be spent on technology demonstrators and research programs similar to
those conducted by NASA and the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA, formerly the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA). In making their case, they argue that maintaining a
national commitment to defense R&D is vital not only for the future of French military aerospace but also
for the general health of the French aircraft industry (Covault, 1993; Sparaco, 1993; Velocci, 1993).
Since the late 1970s, the French Ministxyof Defense has actively sought greater dual-use synergies
from itsresearch. A new directorate, Dke(_n des R_s, Etudes et Techniques (DRE_nalogous
to the U.S. (D)ARPA though lacking in its flexibility and responsiveness---was created in 1977. DRET has
been charged with coordinating all defense-related work in the public and private sectors (including "dual-
use"technologies), monitonngdefense-related developments in S&T generally, and helping to define French
defense research priorities(AdkJns,1993; Sparaco, 1994; U.S. Congress, 1982). DRET has 2000 staff and
funds approximately 200 medium to longterm projectsannually, including some work at ONERA. Like most
of their European neighbors, the French place no legal, regulatory, or accounting barriers to combining
military and civil activities in the same facility. One of the more notable successes of this approach is the
CATIA (Computer-Graphics-Aided Three Dimensional Interactive Application) Computer-Aided-
Design/Computer-Aided-Manufacture (CAD/CAM) system, which was first developed by Dassault and IBM
as part of the Mirage 5 fighter program and later used by Boeing in its RD&P of the prize-winning 777.
British industdaUsts and policymakers envy the responsibility assumed by the Ministry of Defense for
maintaining the health and vitality of France's defense industrial base. This is understandable given the
neglect shown by Britain'sDefense Ministry for doing the same in the UoK.(U.K. House of Commons, 1993).
ThUd, a unique feature of French technology strategies and policies is the concept of the technopo/e
---regional centers of excellence developed to capitalize more widely on public investments in high technolo-
gy programs. Tectznopo/eswere intended to create a =critical mass" of scientists and engineers for a certain
technologyand to stimulate associated knowledge, technology, and industrial development. Mature techno-
po/es were act as a magnet for other high value, high technology industrieswhich would derive advantage
from accessto an increasingly skilled workforce and a research-dense community. Toulouse, home of the
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Ecole SupCv_ur de I'A_ronautique et de rEspace (SupAero)---the premier aeronautical Grand Eco/e_has
been the main technopo/e for commercial aeronautics and space-related activities. After World War II, it
became the main focus for civil aircraft programs, including the Caravelle, the Concorde, the Airbus, and
the Franco-ltalian ATR regional transport consortium.
Fourth,an interlockingnetwork of industrialexecutives and govemment officials--virtually all alums
of the grand _}co/es--#nanage the entire chain of production in France. At the highest level, this can lead
to politically-driven changes in senior management of the state-run enterprises. More importantly, the
consequence of thistightlyknit network is that both sides have a close and detailed insight into the general
direction of technology strategies and policies; as a result, the often dgid and conservative approaches to
innovation in France are reinforced.
In additionto the abbreviated listof agencies noted previously, two deserve mention as recent addi-
tions to the French innovationsystem. The first is the Agence nationale pourla valorisation de la recherche
(ANVAR, National Agency for the Promotion of Research). Funded by the French Ministries of Research
and Education, this national agency for the promotion of research provides technology "diagnostics"tests
to identifythe market potential of products. It also conducts marketing studies and offers legal assistance.
The second is the _s tdgionauxd"el_alJon et de Pansfertde technologies (CRI'I-Fs). Created in 1982,
this institution promotes joint and cooperative ventures between pubic and private organizations (Adkins.
1993; Chandler and Daems, 1980).
The Evolution of French Innovation Public Policy in Aviation
In many ways, the history of aviation in France is a testament to the conservative, risk-averse ap-
proachto entrepreneurshipand innovation previouslydiscussed. At the same time, however, aviation stands
out as an incrediblesuccessstory in at least two time padeds: in its earlier years unfettered by government
involvement and more recentlyas the government has shinedfrom a misslon-odented to a diffusion-oriented
set of strategies and policies, at least in aeronautics.
In its early days, individual entrepreneurs and engineers combined their efforts to launch French
aeronauticsand aviation. Their accomplishments are legendary: Frenchmen flying French planes rivaled
U.S. competitom for world records; Farman and Brdguet were net exporters of aircraft; Gnome and Rhone,
Hispano, and Renault were net exporters of engines. Eventually, a combination of very slow economic
growth and an ultraconservative French officer corps depressed demand and the fragmented structure of
competitive firms hampered further development. Aircraft manufacturers confronted a major obstacle to
their advancement: an entrenched pattem of government patronage in industry. French policymakers tded
repeatedlyto compel these engineer-entrepreneursto merge into larger companies based on the technopo/e
logic, butthe manufacturemresisted. They prefen'ed to duster themselves into groupements instead. This
cont'_]uration offered individual companies autonomy: within their groupement they could preserve their
own fixedcapital, productionfacilities, researchlaboratories,and administrative
services. Each group crea_eda central bureauto parcel out ordersto member
firms, negotiatecontracts,and search for foreign clients. In effect the groups
servedmoreas marketing cartels.... (Chapman, 1991, p. 37).
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This industrial structure fell far short of the genuine concentration desired by French policymakers, but did
carry the firms closer to a unified structure.
L_=onBlum's Popular Front nationalized commercial aircraft manufacturers in 1936. Several small
firms merged to form largergroupement and two prominent engineer-entrepreneurs, Brdguet and Dassault,
lost their factories. (This pattern followed the government-directed 1932 rationalization of French airlines
into a singlecompany with the French government as an important minority stockholder.) As a result of the
German occupation cludng World War II, French aviation languished until after the war, when the industry
was nationalized again, and government officials used low-cost credit, direct subsidy, import protection,
govemment procurement, and investment financingto promote LCA RD&P. In addition, firms were "required
to subcontract extensively with one another in order to utilize all production resources" (Hochmuth, 1974,
p. 165). This, together with the groupement structure of industry already in place, helped set the stage for
collaboration in Airbus Industde.
Since the 1960s, the French govemment has encouraged the formation of several "national cham-
pions"in aeronautics: Adrospatiale in civil airframes, missiles,and helicopters; Dassault in fixed wing military
aircraft and business jets; _ Nationale d'Etude et de Construction de Moteurs d'Aviation (SNECMA)
in engines;and Thomson-CSF, Dassault Electronics, and Sextant Avionics (a grouping of A_'ospatiale and
Thomson) in avionics and equipment. All French aerospace firms are entitled to receive launch aid,
production credits, or advanced reimbu_ables for civil programs; the French govemment also provides
capital infusionsand organizes financial restructuringwhen necessary. Aid is repayable from sales and has
been up to 100% of costs; more recently, the level has been closer to 50% or less (U.S. Congress, 1991).
Eventually, France added intemaUonalcollaboration to its mix of industrial support. Several factom
combined to impel the French to travel this path. The Algedan War drained the French treasury and LCA
RD&P suffered from the loss of government financial support. Foreign sales and investment wore needed
and collaborationseemed an obviousway to generate both. Germany and the United States were beginning
to dominate aeronautical R&D and the French wanted to tap into that technological expertise. Continental
collatxxation was viewed as a means of drivinga wedge between the United States and the United Kingdom.
Finally, the French feared its aeronautical firms would suffer from a rationalization process occurring in the
industryat the global level which would relegate them forever to the status of component suppliers (Golich,
1991; Lorell, 1980).
Typically, the French seek leadership roles in international management consortia such as Airbus
Industrie. In the case of the latter, the French heavily promoted Toulouse as the center for Airbus final
assembly and commercial exploitation, and resisted strongly, though unsuccessfully, German demands for
a final assembly of all new nanow-bodiedtransports.Most French collaboration has had a European focus;
however, the French partnered with the United States' General Electric Aircraft Engine Group (GE) to build
civil engines despite the "natural" link with the British firm, Rolls Royce (RR). France's SNECMA joined
forces withGE to build the highly successful CFM-56 family of aircraft engines (Hayward, 1986; 1994). On
projects such as Concorcle, Airbus, and the CFM56 engine, French industry beneFdted from working with
equal or superior partners in the U.K. and the United States.
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Currently, French technologystrategies and policies can be characterized as a blend of mission and
diffusion orientation. Informed by policymaker perceptions about France's global status_particulady v/s_-
wsthe United States, butalso with respectto potentialContinental competitors---and by histodcal precedent,
French publicpolicieshave consistentlyand carefully (if not always successfully) promoted specific projects
in strategic industrysectors. They have done so to achieve multiple goals. At the most obvious level, these
policieshave been designedto generate an odginal product---e.g., the Airbus Industde aircraft. In addition,
the French have quite openly sought to gain and maintain a leadership position in certain high technology
industriesbecause they recognize both the spill-over effects into downstream industdes and the critical pull
effect for upstream industries. Finally, the French have consciously aspired to satisfy social and economic
welfare goals with their strategies and policies. In particular, they have sought to create and maintain high
technology, high wage jobs. To achieve these ends, French public policy has employed transparent inter-
ventiontools, includingeducation, urban planning, subsidy, ownership, and a vadety of protections against
foreign competitors. Judged simply by the leading role played by French companies in so many major Euro-
pean aerospace programs, France's national aviation and space-related technology strategies and policies
would have to be considered a success. For example, in 1974, when the first Airbus aircraft was shipped,
management's stated goal was to capture one-thirdof the LCA market; by 1995, after a shaky beginning and
an uncertain pedod through the late 1970s, Airbus held roughly30% of the market; a year later, Airbus' claim
to market share had increased to neady 33% (Aboulafia, 1997, p. 43; Proctor and Sparaco, 1997, p. 371).
GERMANY
Unlike France, Germany has pursued =diffusion-oriented =technology strategies and policies, with
little emphasis on defense R&D relative to that given to commercial R&D (Becher and Ag, 1993; Keck,
1993). The German government has provided support for a research infrastructure and training since the
late 1800s; post 1945 proh,_itionsreinforced these structural patterns. Since Wodd War II, both the federal
(Buno) and state (/Jndet) govemments have funded programmatic research activity. At the federal level,
govemments from boththe Left and Right have supported a sedes of high-cost projects including Airbus and
space-related activities. _ have complemented this assistance with their own promotion of technologi-
cal innovation;for example, the Bavadan government has hacked aerospace and automotive industdal de-
velopment. Since the mid-1960s, Germany has pursued a well-conceived strategic approach to aerospace
R&D encompassingits three main sectors-commercial, military, and space. The primary aims were to ob-
tain the competitive and broader economic benefits perceivedto be associated with aerospace, and to defray
the costsof German defense commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Regional in-
terests were also served by supporting aerospace centers in the north and south of Germany (Hayward,
1990). More recently,German aerospace has struggled to absorb and to modemize the limited capabilities
of the former Deutsche DemocratLsche Republik (DDR, or German Democratic Republic).
Evolution of German Technology Strategies and Policies
Germany became a unified political unit rather late in the game. While France, the U.K., and the
U.S. were consolidatingnational identity,Germany still consisted of individual territories, each complete with
its own laws, currency, weights and measures, taxes, and custom tolls. Even after merging to form the Ger-
man empire in 1871, the BL=ndexercised authorityover very few functions,such as foreign policy and nation-
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aldefense.TheformationoftheGermannation-statewasinfluencedsignificantlybyeconomiconcems.
ToenableGewnanindustryto catchupwiththeindustrializedcountries--particularly Britain and France_
Fdeddch List proposed a customs union which would protect "infant industries" from stronger competition
(Keck, 1993; Tickner, 1987). From this beginning, Germany proceeded to acquire by virtually any means
possible--espionage, immigration, procurement of machinery, and education--the knowledge, technology,
and skilled workers needed to move from an agradan to an industdal economy.
Germany successfully adopted the French university system of the early nineteenth century as a
primanj focus of scientific research. Supported by a networkof institutes with laboratories for the natural sci-
ences, as well as specialized libraries for the humanities, university research quickly elevated Germany to
world leadershipin medicine, chemistry, and physics. However, little was done in the realm of engineering.
Recognizing the value of skilled technicians to industrialization, the Prussians established a system of
polytechnical schools, which stressed the use of the scientific method and mathematics, to train research
engineers and engineeringtechnicians. By 1870, these schoois---called Technische Hochschu/en--had as-
cended to a status nearly equivalent to universities. "By the beginning of the twentieth century Germany had
established a sophisticated system for education in scientific, technical, and commercial matters, reaching
from elementary school to the doctoral level" (Keck, 1993, p. 122). The system graduated more engineers,
engineering technicians, and scientists--relative to the size of its population--than France, and attracted
students from around the world.
In addition to federally-provided higher education, German Lander established 40 to 50 institutes
for specialized research in a number of applied areas, including weather and atmosphere, geography and
geology, shipbuilding, and hydro engineering. Building on that tradition, the Bund established the Impedal
Instituteof Physics and Technology (PhysikaUsch-technische ReichsanstalO in 1887, to work on standards
and measures for the development of precision instruments, a pattern that was replicated across many of
the science disciplines. Yet another mechanism to finance fundamental and applied R&T was based on the
U.S. model of tapping industry for research funds: The Kaiser-Wilhelm-Society (precursor to the Max-
Planck-Society created in 1948) used resourcesfrom industry and govemments--including real estate, sala-
des, and subsidi_o finance both basic and applied research in chemistry, physical chemistry, coal
research, biology, and experimental therapy (Keck, 1993).
By the beginningof the twentieth century, Germany was the envy of many other industrialized and
industrializing states. Taking advantage of its position as a technology follower, Germany adopted new
technology from abroad and moved it to useful production eff'miently and effectively. Though seriously
disrupted by World Wars I and II, Germany had created an impressive system of knowledge diffusion---a
variety of highereducation opportunitiescoupledwith multiple research venues--which enabled its firms and
industries to create new or improve existing processes, products, systems, and services as advances in
science and technology became available. (For more on the structure of R&D and technological innovation,
and the diffusion of knowledge and technology in Germany, see Allen, 1987; Becher and Ag, 1993; Hart,
1986b; Kuster, 1974; Meyer-Krahmer, 1990; 1992; Schimank, 1988; v. Massow, 1983; Wamken and
Ronning, 1990; Wortmann, 1990).
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GermanPublicPolicyAffectingthe Diffusionof Knowledgeand Technology
Thediffusionof knowledgeandtechnologyinGermanytodaymstilldecentralizedamongindustry,
theBund, and the Lander--is part of a broader industrial policy which is embedded in a "general economic
policy aimed at maintaining full employment with stable prices, balanced foreign trade and satisfactory ex-
pansion" (Organizationfor Economic Cooperation and Development, 1971, p. 27). Public policy focuses on
maintaining a system of higher educationand facilities, as well as engineers and scientists, who can conduct
the basic research necessary for technological innovation. The system beneFdsfrom the public provision
of a research infrastructure, including data networks, university chairs for computer science, hospital re-
search groups,and genetic research centers. Financial subsidies are limited to social needs (environment,
health, and climate), to key sectors of national or European technological and economic competitiveness,
and to long-term development of scientificand technical knowledge and technology (Schmidt-K0ntzel, 1993).
Tax incentives have also been employed to encourage appropriate industry-level R&D.
The Bundesministen'um for Forschung und Technologie (BMFT, or Federal Ministry for Research
and Technology)--the pdmary source of R&D funds in Germany--does notsubsidize individual firms through
direct projectfinancing. Instead, it finances specific technology developments, with support not exceeding
50% of development costs. The BMFT fosters the diffusion of knowledge and technology among German
universities, research institutes,and industry, and links technology-oriented enterprises and research estab-
lishmentsby (a) sponsoringintemshipsin R&D institutionsfor young industry scientists and engineers to help
develop their skillsand their (tacitand explicit) knowledge base; (b) partially funding R&D contracts to small
and medium firms; (c) providing incentives for collaborative research in contracts to universities, R&D
institutes,and industry;(d) helpingfirms poolwe-competitive data, information, and knowledge; (e) creating
links and alliances between suppliersand usersof specialized inputs; (e) fostering inter-firm communications
about knowledge and technology that exist outside their companies; and (f) establishing centers of excel-
lence to serve as =honest brokers" and provide neutral and independent data, information, and knowledge
to industryin an effort to reduce the uncertaintyand risks associated to the introduction of new technologies.
Occasionally, BMFT offers 9ndirect-specific" incentives to speed up the diffusion of knowledge and techno-
logy trensfer to particular industrysectors(Bruder, 1983; Humphreys, 1989; Keck, 1993; Kreile, 1978; Meyer-
Krahmer, Gielow, and Kuntze, 1983; Meyer-Krahmer, 1981; Schmidt-KLintzel, 1993).
Schmidt-KQnlzel (1993) outlinesthe currant German diffusion infrastructure: FPst, universities and
their research institutes(prirnadlysupportedby Lzlndet), the Max-Planck-Geselischaft (MPG), and the Deut-
sche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Association) (jointly financed by the Bund and
conductmost of Germany's basic research. Largely autonomous, they have established a solid re-
putation for German science. Second, the National Research Centers (GFE) receive 90% of their support
from the federal government and 10% from one or more host/__nder. Originally created for nuclear re-
search, they nowwork on applied energy R&T, particles research, as well as information, communications,
production,and processtechnologies. Third,the Fraunhofer Geseischa# (l=hG, Fraunhofer Society), created
in 1949, is financed by the BMFT and industryat a 60:30 ratio. FhG institutes actively work to diffuse know-
ledge and technology. Wdh its linksto universities and industry, the FhG helps reduce the gap that opened
in the German innovationsystem when the Max-Planck-Society moved toward basic research. Fourth, mul-
tiple science foundations modeled on the orderof the Rockefeller Foundation (e.g., the Volkswagen Founda-
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tion),complementgovemmenteffortsbyprovidingseedmoneyfor new or unorthodox initiatives. F/fth,
German industrial firms and organizations finance 86% of their own R&D.
The Evolution of German Innovation Public Policy in Aviation
In the early days of aviation, Germany (and Holland) challenged France for superiority. Germany
partnered with Anthony Fokker---after the British and the Dutch governments rejected his aircraft sales
offer_in an explicit effort to buildup its militaryarsenal leading up to World War I (Lederer, 1985; Middleton,
1986; Weyl, 1965; Winter, Byshyn and Clark, 1969). Between wars, German aerodynamicists and
engineers, prohibitedby the Treaty of Vemailles from building airplanes of more than 100 horsepower, turned
to gliders to learn valuable lessons in aerodynamic structure that later benef'dted German aircraft design
(Winter, Byshyn, and Clark, 1969). Germany also continued its collaborative work with Fokker and
established firms to work on aircraft in other countries. Thus, in 1925, when finally parmitted to conduct
passenger operation, Germany was the only country with new generation aircraft; other European nations
had concentrated on converting military airplanes into commercial planes. Once the treaty restrictions were
dropped, Germany's aviation industry became a thinly disguised military machine.
From 1945 to 1955 Germany's aircraft manufacturing sector virtually ceased to exist as new treaty
requirements forbid "flying even model airplanes, much less gliders" (Winter, Byshyn, and Clark, 1969).
When Germany re-entered the LCA production sector, it first tried to move from licensed co-production to
indigenous programs. Explicit government support for commercial aviation began in 1962 and was
separated from militaryR&D with the Ministryfor the Economy exercising authority over the former, and the
Ministry of Defense over the latter. Eventually, R&D costs and market size problems forced Germany to
adopt internationalcollaboration as a strategy to sustain indigenous production. This led to participation in
each of the major European aircraft projects--including Airbus and the Tomado bomber--and significantly
increased German industrialcompetence, especially in airframe and engine technology. Most of Germany's
recent collaborative ventures have been with European partners, but since the eady 1970s, the Germans
have supported European linksand allianceswiththe U.S. on space programs. The German aircraft industry
is also weridng with Rockwell International on the NASA-funded X-31 demonstrator program.
Substantial weaknesses in German equipment and avionics capabilities remain, largely attributable
to the lack of German-led programs and the dominance of British and French firms in the more technically
advanced aspects of major collabomUveprograms. For example, in 1993 and 1994, when the Experimental
Fighter Aircraft (EFA) development ran into problems, German inexperience with systems design and
integrationwas blamed. Recently, German policymakers have taken a more aggressive line in demanding
access to higher value design and more demanding industrial responsibilities. These ambitions were
underlined by the formation of Deutsche Aerospace A.G. (DASA) as a subsidiary of Daimler-Benz, one
Germany's most important manufacturing companies. Renamed Daimler-Benz Aerospace, DASA was
created through multiple mergers of German aircraft and engine manufacturers and the acquisition of the
outstandingshares of the Netherlands' Fokker Aircraft. This restructuring brings together under one roof the
bulk of German airframe, missile, engine and avionics activity; the other main aerospace companies are
Siemens in avionics and BMW in engines.
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Governmentsupportforaerospacehasbeenchanneledthroughdefenseprocurement,agrowing
spacebudget,andrepayablelaunchaidfor civil programs. Public funding is provided through the BMFT,
the German research establishments, the Deutsche Forschungsantatt f(ir Luft- und Raumfahrt (DLR) for
aeronautics, and through research conducted by universities and other institutions. The German Ministry
of Defense only funds research for specific militaryprograms--a measure designed to prevent the distortion
of research priorities by national security. The DLR is specifically remitted to support high risk, long term
aeronautical R&D. Over haft of itsfunding comes directly from the BMFT budget, with the remainder provid-
ed under industry or government contract (U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, 1994).
Government financial support for German aerospace was hit by the downturn in defense spending--
up to 60%--since 1990. In common with other major European aerospace states, German aerospace is
dependent on large scale military programs such as EFA to generate many of the advanced technology
concepts that underpin its overall capabilities. Budgetary priorities associated with reunification have also
led to reductions in space and general aeronautics R&D budgets. Nevertheless, support for LCA RD&P has
grown by 63% since 1981, with the bulk of the money going to Airbus Industrie. The German government
has pledged to spend $738 millionfor dvil aeronautical research between 1995 and 1998. The commitment
was based an eight-point plan for the industry published in November 1993, which called for
• a multilateral GATT agreement;
• strict enforcement of the existing GATT agreements;
• creation of a new support structure for R&D;
• a separate aeronautical research program under the European Union Framework program;
• maintenance of minimum defense industrial capacities;
• support for satellite technology investment;
• retention of more air force overhaul work in Germany; and
• promotion of a wider public understanding of the importance of aerospace technology and its
contribution to economic growth ('Facing the Crisis," 1994).
Although some doubtslinger regardingGerman willingnessto support expensive aerospace programs indefi-
nitely, (given the continuing costsof unification),cleady both govemment and industry want to increase Ger-
many's role in collaborative programs and its influence over the future of European aerospace. For example,
German determination to increase its share of the Airbus program---especially to obtain final assembly
responsibilities---has been fueled, in part, by its desire to reduce the industry's defense dependence.
Germany's diffusionistapproach isfirmly grounded inthe assumption that targeted access to advan-
ces in knowledge and technologybenefits the nation and ¢s economy. The approach is reinforced by a his-
tory of direct government involvement bothin the economy and in knowledge and technology diffusion. The
success of this approach is perhapsbest manifested by Germany's remarkable economic recovery following
World War II. Even with the adjustment problems triggered by the reunification processes still under way,
Genrnany'seconomy remains the keystoneof the European Union. It has a wall-deserved reputation for the
meticulous RD&P of fine automobiles, electronics,and pharmaceuticals, and has made impressive advances
along the steep learning curve of LCA RD&P. Its participation in Airbus Industrie signifies and supports
continued advancement along this curve and generates important economic and social welfare benet'ds.
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THEUNITEDKINGDOM
LikeFrance,theBritishgovemmenthasplayedbothdirectandindirectrolesinthe industry'sdevel-
opment,anditsinvolvementhastypicallybeencharacterizedbyamission-orientedapproach.However,
in contrasto the moreconsistentapproachesto innovationinFranceandGermany,Britishtechnology
strategiesandpolicieshavevacillatedinintensityandstyle,reflectingoscillationsin itspublicpolicygeneral-
ly that haveaccompaniedchanges in government. Though the resulting uncertainty and volatility have
wreaked havoc at times in commercial aviation, the United Kingdom is still one of the wodd's leading aero-
space countries, ranked second in Europe (behind France) in terms of sales. In addition to a major LCA
engine fim'P-.Rolls Royce---and a pdme manufacturer of smaller regionalaircraft--British Aerospace (Bae)--
Britain is home to globallysuccessfulequipment and avionics industries. The U.K. spends much of its pub-
lidy-funded R&D on defense with a strong emphasis on aerospace. A separate research budget supports
civil aeronautics, and a range of state-assisted research facilities.--now consolidated in the semi-privatized
Defense Research Agency (DRA)--fosters both civil and military R&D.
Evolution of British Technology Stlllt_je$ and Policies
The evolu'donof any conscious technology strategiesand policiesin the U.K. is faidy short compared
to other OECD states, and was precipitated largely by Wodd Wars I and II and the Cold War. Until shaken
by these traumatic events, early successes at achieving political stability_ least since 1688_and econo-
mic pm_cedty---as manifested by its longstandingpositionas the global economic hegemon and its =first mo-
ver" through the IndustrialRevolution--provided little incentive to change. The Bdtish adopted political and
economic liberalismsequentially_not simultaneous_jas in the United States (see Pinelli, Kennedy, Barclay,
and Bishop, 1997, Chapter 2)_and avoided the violent upheavals which defeated feudalism in countries
such as France or Germany. As a result, tradition and ritual associated with many "pre-capitalist elements
of deference and truculence"embedded in such enduringcultural conventions as the monarchy and the aris-
tocracy have proven remarkably resistantto change (Desai, 1989, p. 302). For example, the Industrial Rev-
olutionof the eighteenth century was launched by religious dissenters who were shoved out of university ed-
ucation and turned to pumue the "practical arts"of engineering and science in their own "public"schools; the
landed, capital-richaristocracy--educated in ancient languages and philosophies---played a relatively insigni-
ficant role. Still, to this day, the lattertypicallycomprise the governing and corporate elite, whereas the wor-
kers and researchers critical to production and innovation come from the middle-classes. (For more on the
historicaldevelopment and continuing influence of Britain's culture, see Burke, 1986; Chandler and Daems,
1980; Desai, 1989; Gilpin, 1975; Hobsbawm, 1987; Sen, 1984; Walker, 1993; Wiener, 1981).
As a =first mover," Britain was not initially threatened by the industrialization efforts undertaken by
its continentalneighbom or colonial possessions. Its empire spanned the globe providing massive markets
forthe new goods produced; except for its role in acquiring and maintaining these territories, the state has
been notably absent in the evolution of technological innovation. Until recently, the British government's
economic rolewas primarilyconfined to some regulatory functions-e.g., financial markets and property law
--and to the advancement and military protection of foreign trade. Unlike the governments of France and
Japan, the British state has not acted as an entrepreneur itself. When it did take more aggressive and
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transparent steps to influence the economy in general and commercial aviation in particular, the learning
curve for effective intervention was painful and steep (Hayward, 1989; 1983; Walker, 1993).
Because early industrialization occurred despite govemmental neglect and in the absence of any
kind of technology-focusededucational or innovationsystem, few policymakers presumed such an infrastruc-
ture was needed. Unfortunately, the culture and institutionsthat first sparked and then sustained industrial
development in the late 1700s and early 1800s proved inadequate for the new industries that emerged in
the late 1800s and later served to underpin economic advance throughout the twentieth century; for them,
.scientificunderstanding and methods informed--sometimes consciously and sometimes unconsciouslym
criticallyimportanttechnological advances. To make matters worse, the early successes seemed to breed
eventual failure insofaras industrialand governmental leaders became obsessed with defending rather than
expandingtheir markets and territories. At the same time, the power of organized labor increased as mana-
gerial authority and competence weakened. Ultimately, of course, the spread of industrialization to other
states--which, as late comers, generally recognized more cleady the value of technological innovation---
developed compeUtorsand eventually undermined Britain'shegemonic position. Ironically, Britain aided and
abetted the process by exporting its capital and technology and maintaining an open intemational trading
system (Gilpin, 1975; Hobsbawm, 1987; Landes, 1969; Mackinder, 1904; Sen, 1984; Stein, 1984).
British Public Policies Affecting the Diffusion of Knowledge and Technology
The hallmarks of BritiStlpublic policiesmeant to influencethe diffusion of knowledge and technology
are instability,vacillation, and lack of coordination between state and market actors. These characteristics
derive largely from =the violent doctrinal swings that have occurred in British governance," but also from
belated "reactions,and often overreactions, to the perceived failure of policies during the preceding period"
intended to arresteconomic decline (Walker, 1993, po187). Four key factors have affected the development
and implementation of technologystrategies and policies,such as they are. First, like France and the United
States, the U.K. has generally pursued a "mission odentation" to knowledge diffusion driven by perceived
militaryneeds. Defense procurement absorbsthe largest portion of high technology engineedng resources.
The consequences for Britain have been largely negative. With a relatively weak technology skill base, the
emphasis on military R&D has resulted in little spinoff into the civil sector. This is exacerbated by the fact
that, even though there are few boundaries within individual firms with regard to transferring military
technology to commercial projects, Britain's Ministry of Defence, unlike the Pentagon in the U.S. or the
_ pour/'Atman_nt in France, resolutely refusesto take responsibility for the development
of technologiesthat are nottied to specific defense needs (Katdor, Sharp, and Walker, 1986; Kaldor, 1982;
Advisow Council on Science and Technology, 1989; Walker, 1993). The specialized needs of the military
begets what Kaldor (1982) calls =baroque technology" with little relevance to the commercial sector. And,
finally, firms with technological capabilities are lured away from risky, market-oriented ventures--in the
absence of public support-toward the guaranteed profits associated with military contracts.
Second, the educational infrastructure in Bdtain is notadequately designed to graduate highly skilled
engineers and productionworkersas well scientists. A formal education system did not even exist in Britain
until the late nineteenth century; as in France, university education focused on the more traditional and
esoteric liberal arts. Since the 1960s, a number of reforms have been implemented, however, British
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educationremainselitist.Accessisdeterminedmorebywealthandclassstatusthanbytalentorability;as
aresult,asmallerproportionofyoungpeoplemoveintoanykindof highereducation. Britain possesses no
equivalent of the French Grand Ecoles or Polytechniques or the German Technische Hochschulen to train
engineers, scientists,technicians, and managers; consequently, the "output of skilled manpower is lower at
all levels in Britain than in France and Germany" (Walker, 1993, p. 179; Prais, 1988).
7h_, the Britishinnovation "system"lacks effective coordination among the various players. Britain
possessesfew, if any, "bridging" institutions similar to Germany's Fraunhofer Gesellschaft; scant producer-
user linkagesexist within any industrysector--even aerospace where such connections are a near universal
characteristic; British industrialmanagement tends to be hierarchical and better suited to small enterprises;
and virtually no coordination between banks and industrial enterprises exists.
Fore/h, Britishinvestment in R&D has been consistentlyunimpressive. Public expenditures on R&D
inthe U.K., though relatively highthroughout most of the post-war pedod, were not very effective, and they
have declined dmmaUcallysince the 1970s; in addition, spending on basic research has been relatively low.
W#h most of the funding focused on defense, little was left to support commercial developments. As public
funds vanished, the pdvate sector was expected to step up to the plate. British policymakers---influenced
by a neo-liberal ideology which advocates that industry alone should decide which technologies to bring to
market and should carry the associated risks as well----have emphasized the need for greater "value-for-
money'; in doing so, they have "diverted attention away from the large-scale, collective, and resource-
intensive nature of much contemporarytechnologicalactivity," and failed to recognize the risk-averse nature
of firms when faced with lengthy and uncertain return-on-investment cycles (Walker, 1993, p. 186). (For
more on the characteristics of Britain'sinnovationsystem, see Caimcross, 1992; Chandler and Daems, 1980;
Desai, 1989; Freeman, 1989; Hayward, 1989; 1983; Jones, 1965; Young and Hood, 1964).
Following Wodd War II, British policymakers perceived a need for greater public involvement in
technological innovation. Direct R&D funding, laboratories and other research facilities, public procurement
intended to create new production capabilities and spawn new or re-create older industries--in particular
nuclear and aerospece--wem all adopted as parts of a transparent industrial policy. Research associations
designed to pool corporate resources were encouraged with matching public funds. During the 1960s, the
National Economic Development Council (NEDC), a creature of the Labour Party, served as a forum for
labor, corporations, and government to develop science and technology strategies. By the 1970s,
policymakers were disillusioned by the ineffectiveness and often damaging effects of British govemment
programmatic intervention in the market. Though fluctuating between Conservative and Labour Party
governance, publicpolicy began to shift back to its more traditional/a/ssez-fa/re approach to the economy.
By the 1980s, the transitionwas complete. Margaret Thatcher was in power;,state-owned enterprises
were pdvalJzed;the government sought to reduce public expenditure in general and R&D expenses in par-
ticular by passingoff both costs and benefits of riskyinvestments to the pdvate sector. Budgetary allocations
were centralized within the Cabinet Office; its Advisory Committee on Science and Technology (ACOST)
became the focal point for S&T conversations, with an emphasis on competition, entrepreneurship, and
decentralized decision-making. The only exceptionsto these trends were continued commitments to defense
R&D and to Airbus Industrie-related launch aid. Local Enterprise Agencies and science parks--products of
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joint ventures by govemment, business,financial institutions,and universities--appeared; starved for capital,
these entities have mostly sought to make themselves attractive to foreign investment.
By the mid-1990s, the U.K. had fallen behind its European neighbors in terms of public support for
aeronautical research and technology acquisition (R&TA). Even R&TA funded through the defense budget
has declined, reflecting both general trends in defense spending and changes in procurement philosophy.
Corporate contributions to defense research and demonstrator programs have risen from a typical 15% in
the late 1980s to at least 35% in 1993; in some cases, programs, once funded completely by the Ministry
of Defence (MoD), now receive private support of roughly 30-40% (House of Commons, 1993). As the gov-
emment distances itself from industrysupport,Britain is becoming increasingly integrated into the European
innovation system. For all intents and purposes, the U.K. has ceded its leadership in aeronautics and com-
mercial aviation to France and is dependent on foreign investment to finance technological development
(Adkins, 1993; Hayward, 1994; Patel and Pavitt, 1990; U.K. House of Commons, 1993; U.K. Padiament,
1965; U.S. Intemational Trade Commission, 1993; Walker, 1993).
The Evolution of British Innovation Public Policies in Aviation
Britain'scommercial aviationdevelopment following World War II reflects its ambivalence about the
proper rolefor govemment in the market; "responsibility for project choice, monitoring and control was left
in limbo between a full, free-market private-enterprise system and state interventionism _ (Hayward, 1983,
p. 36). The British were among the firs1to recognize aviation's potential strategic value; they rejected a
freedom-of-the-air doctrine proposed at a 1910 international law conference which was grounded in Hugo
Grotius' 1604 freedom-of-the-seas principle. They favored recognitionof sovereign air space above national
ten_toriesand acted decisively to safeguard theirs by empowering the state =to regulate the entry of foreign
aircraft and to proscribe zones over which foreign aircraft were not allowed to fly" (J0nsson, 1981, p. 271).
The European continent quickly followed suit (Cooper, 1947; 1952; Golich, 1989; JOnsson, 1981).
As Bdtishaviation transiUonedfrom small, competitive, engineer-entrepreneurs to big business, the
govemment supported the industry via procurement from a =magic circle= of manufacturers; the intent was
to sustain a "slmtegic reserve"of pdvate firms by guaranteeing a constant flow of income from state-owned
aidineswhich were requiredto =BuyBdtis/l"-manufacturedaircraft (Hayward, 1983, p. 4). During World War
II, the govemment established an aviation review committee, chaired by Lord Brabazon, to develop and
implement a plan to exploit the British advantage deriving from their discovery and development---con-
currentlywith, butobviouslyseparately from, the Germans--of jet-engine technology. Despite a bias against
detailed government involvement in the market, the committee literally designed nine transports, known as
the =Brabazon Types,"and then requiredBritishaircraft manufacturers to build them. The option of pursuing
licensed production with U.S. manufacturers--preferred by most industry managers_was consistently
rejected by govemment policymakers (Golich, 1991; Hayward, 1983; 1989).
Following the war, four factors continued to influence U.K. public policy toward aviation:
(1) the persistentbeliefthat civil aviationwas criticalto both nationalsecurityand
economicrecovery;(2) a sense of inferiorityvis-a-visthe UnitedStatesrelatedto
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Britain'sheavyeconomicindebtednessto itsAtlanticAlly,coupledwiththeconvic-
tionthat a revitalizedcommercialaircraftindustrycouldrepresenta resurgentand
autonomousBritain,lessdependentonitsformer colony; (3) a large aerospacela-
bor pool;and (4) the postwarLabourgovemment'sideologicalcommitment to a
planned,centrallydirectedindustrialandeconomicrecovery(Golich, 1991, p. 129).
Unfortunatelyfor Britain'sLCA manufacturers, thisperiod of government involvement was ineffective at best
and harmful at worst. Insensitiveto the complex nature of market forces, public policymakers defined speci-
fic product outcomes rather than supporting general technology advances. British aidines were caught in
the middle:They were required to "Buy British= as an =honorable legacy of the war = (Hayward, 1983, p. 15),
but doing so meant they were unable to compete in the global market--where most of the traffic could be
found--because pa.ssengemsoughtthe betterquality service provided by other (mostly U.S.-manufactured)
LCA. A series of governmental inquiries led to a variety of imposed changes in the way business was con-
ducted in the industry--ranging from forced collaboration between aidines and aircraft manufacturers, to
revised versions of "BuyBritish,=to excessive reliance on parochially-influenced, airline-determined specifi-
cations--but none were successful. The rocky road from little or no, to excessive, to ineffective, full circle
to little or no government involvement that bedeviled technology innovation strategies and policies in gener-
al, also plagued policiesdirected at aviation. (For more on the mercurial relationship between government
and industryin aviation, see Cooper, 1947; 1952; Desai, 1989; Golich, 1989; 1991; Hart, 1986b; Hayward,
1983; 1989; Hochmuth, 1974; Jones, 1985; J0nsson, 1981; Shepherd, Duchene and Saunders, 1983;
Walker, 1993; Young and Hood, 1984).
Current Structure of British Aeronautical Knowledge Diffusion
Three agencies support aeronautical R&D in the United Kingdom: the Ministry of Defence, the De-
partment of Trade and Industry(DTI), and the Department of Transportation (DOT). In addition government
agencies fund more general R&D--not necessarily aeronautical---in universities and research establish-
ments. The U.K.'s DoT funds R&D activities intended to solve problems related to the public interest, such
as aircraft safety, noise and environmental pollution, and aviation security.
The MoO is the U.K.'s pdmary sponsorof public aerospace R&D--including aeronautical research--
for both civil and military use. The Royal Aerospace Establishment--the Aerospace Division of the MoD's
Defence Research Agen_nducts most of Britain's aeronautical research. Funded by MoD contracts
and by private industryrevenues, the DRA operates in a commercial fashionand does not receive institution-
al support from the British government. Because the DRA competes with industry for DTI aeronautical re-
search contracts,a poter_al conflict of interest arises with respect to sharing data with firms. The extent of
direct technologytransfer into the public domain depends upon the terms of individual contracts. The con-
tract mechanism is seen as a means of increasing the efficiency of DRA operations, but it has given rise to
fears that the DRA will neglect long term research (U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, 1994). Al-
though the DRA has introduced procedures designed to speed up transferability of defense technology into
the civil sector---and there are few institutional banders between defense and civil aerospace activity at the
level of the finTt--British companies regularly complain that data do not reach private industry fast enough
and several U.K. corporate officials have argued that the MoD should let more of its contracts directly with
industry (U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, 1994; U.K. House of Commons, 1993).
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TheDTIprovideslaunchaidfor civil aeronautics programs guided by two key principles: First, up
to 60% of non-recurring R&D costs may be financed; however, aid or guarantees for production is seldom
provided. Intheory, all aid--plus interest---must be repaid from levies on sales; nonetheless, few programs
have fully repaid their launch aid, though receipts from royalties have outpaced grants for the last three
years. Second, to receive aid, a project must be demonstrably viable in commercial and technical terms,
but nsky enough that a company would not otherwise pursue the project, in theory, launch aid is available
for equipment firms, but none have received any since the 1950s (Hayward, 1983). All of BAe's major Airbus
projectssince 1978---A320, A330, A340---have received launch aid, as has RR's investment in the RD&P
of the RB211 engine family, whereas neither RR's Trent high-power engine nor BAe's R&D of a new range
of regional jet airliners has.
DTI also funds civil technology R&D and research facilities to enhance the British aeronautical
technology base through its Civil Aircraft Research and Demonstration (CARAD) program, which focuses
on long term, pre-competitive research for airframes, propulsion, and avionics (U.K. House of Commons,
1993; U.S. Congress,General Accounting Office, 1994; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
1991; U.S. InternationalTrade Commission, 1993). DTI's CARAD budget declined dramatically over the last
ten years promptingthe development of a National Strategic Technology Acquisition Plan (NSTAP). Pub-
lishedin 1993, the final report identified three categories of research which should inform government and
industry R&TA activity over a 10-15 year span, including
• technologies fundamental to the future well-being of U.K. industries from which the critical
competitiveedge will emerge--the =crownjewels" technologies which provide an independent
capability or an influential role in global ventures;
• enhancingtechnologieswhich will improve the effectiveness of U.K. industry, and without which
the potential of U.Kofirms will be damaged; and
• supporting technologies mainly imported from other industries without which the U.K. will be
severely disadvantaged in the long term (U.Ko House of Commons, 1993).
NSTAP also recommended ways of improving the efficiency of U.K. R&TA spending. In particular, British
R&TA had to be placed within a clearly defined national strategy for the aerospace industry and to identify
how Britain couldmake the best use of international, especially European programs. Finally, NSTAP urged
the adoption of a number of technology demonstrator programs that could act as a focus and catalyst for
near-market research (House of Commons, 1993).
The NSTAP exercise helped to inform British approaches to technology planning generally. In an
echo of the Japanese, MITl-led "visions"(see Pinelli, Kennedy, Barclay, and Bishop, 1997, Chapter 18), the
U.K. has launched a "Foresight" exercise to help identify key technologies for the next two decades. =De-
fence and Aerospace" comprisesone of the Foresightpanels. Over a period of several months during 1994,
the Foresightpanels gathered evidence from industrialists, officials and academics on opinions and insights
about aerospace technology and market needs upto 2015. The results will be used to guide budgetary plan-
ning for govemment and industry R&D.
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Despitethisflushof_trategic-thinldng," British industry still faces a net decline in public funding for
civil aerospace R&TA over the next few years. Moreover, the DRA may now be more market-driven than
is good for the health of the U.K. aerospace industry. The potential problem is magnified by the potential
=squeeze out"effect of "mission-oriented"commitments to defense and to aerospace (Walker, 1993). In this
respect, a decline in public spending in these areas, with an accoml_nying shift of resources to "diffusion-
oriented"strategies might be welcome. However, given that defense and civil aeronautics constitutes one
of the few areas of worldclass Britishmanufacturing,the resultanttransition costs could be high. Worse still,
the current U.K. government is reluctant to make the necessary commitments to a training and research
infrastructure which would be needed to implement an effective diffusionist strategy.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the order of magnitude change in our daily lives wrought by innovation rooted in knowledge
and technological discovery, little has changed in the underlying concepts which guide government policy-
makers in their interactionswith other nations. Indeed, "the policy processes dealing with science and tech-
nology and the enteqxises that encompass them remain predominately national, even if progress in science
and technology and in their applications inexorably moves toward international and even global effects"
(Skoinikoff, 1993, p. 27). Govemment policies influencethe nature of technology that emerges within nation-
al boundaries; moreover, public policies are still intended to serve the objectives of the state, whether fo-
cused on military, economic, political, social security, or some combination of purposes.
Public policies and strategies which target knowledge diffusion are the product of national history,
culture, and perceived needs. Hence, they influence the nature of technological change. Thus, it is critical
to reflect on the match between articulated govemmental goals and the policies and strategies used to
achieve them. For example, no approach to knowledge diffusion is without its faults. A mission orientation
tends to be too focused on a single goal---usually national defense--which may or may not have value for
the broader economy. Such an approach is more susceptible to the problems associated with "pickingwin-
ners and losers." There is less room for the market to evaluate targeted projects because the government
has mandated that the project be pursued, has sunk significant resources into ensuring it is sought, and is,
therefore, reluctantto change course. Usually, by the time a project is determined to be a loser, the cost in
every sense--4inanciel and human capital,social welfare, economic extemaUties---is significant. Occasional-
ly, as inthe case of the Concorde, market failure and the associated financial costs are somewhat compen-
sated for by the denvative benefits of leaming to manage a transnational project of immense complexity and
sophistication (Hayward, 1994; 1993; 1986). More frequently, govemment involvement pulls decision-
making away from program and projectmanagers, creates a rigid hierarchy, fosters competition rather than
cooperation, and leads to antagonistic relationships between labor and management. Despite these prob-
lems, the French, British, and U.S. experiences have demonstrated that a mission orientation can yield
significantsuccesses. Airbus and the constellationof French aerospace firms.--including Af_ospa_ale, Das-
sault, SNECMA, and Thomson-CSF, Dassault Electronics, and Sextant Avionics-and British firms---BAe,
Rolls-Royce, and several key component suppliem--have delivered impressive products which have enjoyed
significantmarket success. Boeing'ssuccess is clearly evidenced by its overwhelming and persistent dom-
ination of the LCA market.
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Adiffusionapproachdoesnotallowforasmuchcontrolordirectionbythegovernmentasamission-
orientedapproach.Becauseadiffusionorientationisnottiedto a specific,measurableoutcome_e.g.,a
familyofnewgenerationLCA--itisdifficultoassessitssuccess.Adiffusionistapproachrequires ignificant
up-frontandon-goingpublicinvestmentin research,testing,andproductionfacilities; in educational, train-
ing, and research institutions;in a research andtechnology infrastructure replete with incentives for collabor-
ation among industry, academic, and government research facilities; and in financing technology develop
ments. Much like LCA RD&P, a diffusionistapproach is risky business; it is expensive and carries uncertain
and distant payoffs. Nevertheless, the benef'ds of such an approach to knowledge and technology diffusion
seem to outweigh its costs. Because it facilitates communication and coordination among researchers, it
has a greater potential for eliminating potentially costly duplication of effort while encouraging the kind of
cross-disciplinaryintellectual stimulation that can lead to dramatic knowledge and technology discoveries.
What is clear is that government intervention in support of knowledge diffusion is a pervasive char-
actedsticof the twentieth century (Lazonick, 1991). No single approach will work for all countries. The range
of optionsforgovemment interventionin the market is significant when one considers the mission-diffusion,
direct-indirect,opaque-transparent overlappingcontinua. Whatever approach is adopted, policymakers are
well-advised to be dear and open about why and how they plan to implement it. Such open discourse ena-
bles policymakers to negotiate difference and manage potential conflict.
Even though no single prescriptionwill ffi all national or industry sector needs, it does seem safe to
conclude that new technologies, enhanced organizational capabilities, and more efficient production pro-
cesses-such as those broughtto LCA RD&P by Airbus Industrie in Europe and by Boeing in the U.S. (see
PineUi, Kennedy, Barclay, and Bishop, 1997, Chapters 1 and 2)---are critical to the creation of valuable
goods, processes,and services for the market. Whereas "public authorities can help firms respond to these
pressures by providing a technological infrastructure to facilitate innovation by individual producers,"
(Majumdar, 1987, p. 515), such efforts must transcend sector-specific public policies. Under conditions of
global oligopoly resulting from large economies of scale and barriers to entry,
the moredominanthe existingorganizationsandthe greaterthe capitalinvestmentsrequiredto enter
theglobalindustry,the morenecessarywill it be for a nationalstrategyto give privilegedaccessto
public resourcesto those nationalbusinessorganizationsthat can best developand utilizethese
resources.(Lazonick,1991, p. 88)
Even if countriesare more open about their interventionto promote knowledge diffusion, we are still
confronted with the tension between national advancement and the market forces in high-cost, high-tech-
nology industriesimpelling us toward globalized RD&P. Aner all, for much of recorded history, competition
has been one of the most important forces driving scientific research and technological development. Ri-
valry between nation-states has been particularly important in this regard. Many significant developments
in transportationand navigation, communications, and especially weaponry originally grew out of the efforts
of one country to gain some military or economic advantage over its neighbors (or to prevent its neighbor
from gaining such an advantage).
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A globalRD&Pstructure,muchliketransnationalstrategicalliancesamongfirms,requiresa certain
leveloftrustandcommunicationamongparticipantswhichspeaksagainsthekindoffreeridingwhichis
implicitinseekingcollaborationfor the purposes of national advancement (Lorell, 1980). The past two de-
cades have witnessed a dramatic shift toward collaboration, particularly during the research and develop
merit (R&D) phases of critical projects. The rise of the "global economy," the "transborder reach" of many
new technologies,the rapidly growingcosts associated with a number of R&D activities, the end of the Cold
War which eased concerns about the vulnerability potentially associated with transnational collaboration ap-
pear to weigh more heavily nowthan the old competitive forces still in place. The rise of transnational R&D
collaborative projectsrepresents a change of historic magnitude, and every indication suggests it is a trend
that will continue well into the twenty-first century (Golich and Kay, 1997).
This transformationis notwithoutsignificant irony. For example, following World War II, European
governments soughtto dominate civil aviation unilaterally because of its perceived strategic value; they pur-
sued that goal with heavy state involvement. Eventually, market forces propelled a variety of transnational
joint ventures among firms as well as a pooling of scarce research, human, and financial capital in govern-
mental research agencies.
Another ironyemerges as private-sector cooperationbeginsto achieve success. To facilitate further
private-sectorgrowth by making transnatJonaiventures even more efficient and effective, state officials must
coordinate government functions such as harmonizing standards for the safe and competent operation of
a commercial aviation production and transportation system (see Pinelli, Kennedy, Barclay, and Bishop,
1997, Chapter 2). This can lead to the creation of supranational governmental authorities, such as the Joint
Airworthiness Requirements Authority. Eventually the network of private and public activity becomes so
complex and intertwined that the beginnings of a new political organization emerges. In any case, for the
foreseeable future, one of the primary challenges confronting government and corporate decision makers
is how to negotiate the tenacious tension between national priorities and global imperatives.
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